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The debate on naturalism in the last years has developed around two main 
interconnected issues: the possibility of naturalizing the items of the manifest image 
of the world and the prospects of non-reductive naturalism. in this article, i will be 
concentrated on the second issue, by looking at two important proposals for a non-
reductive naturalism: hilary Putnam’s liberal naturalism and lynne Baker’s near-
naturalism.
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most philosophical labels are time-independent designators. during their 
respective times, Fichte and hegel were considered idealists, marx and 
nietzsche atheists, aquinas and leibniz realists; and they are still considered as 
such. this is because the labels “idealism”, “atheism”, and “realism” have not 
changed their meanings over time (or, if they have, only in minor respects). With 
the term “naturalism”, instead, the situation is quite different. in a very general 
sense, this term means that nothing can be accepted in one’s philosophy that 
is beyond nature. Yet, the meaning of this definition is not a time-independent 
one. For example, heraclitus, Jean buridan, Francis bacon, giordano bruno and 
goethe can all be considered naturalist philosophers if we look at the cultural 
contexts of their respective times. though, today no philosopher defending 
their views would be considered part of the naturalistic crew.
this happens because the meaning of the term “naturalism” is conceptually 
dependent on the meaning of “natural” and, indirectly, “nature” (from 
which the former derives); in turn, the meanings of these terms have 
changed dramatically over time. giordano bruno, for example, can be 
considered a naturalist as long as one looks to the renaissance view of nature 
– which attributed a crucial role to vitalistic forces and secret non-causal 
correspondences among things –, but certainly today nobody could present 
views similar to bruno’s without being considered a supernaturalist (and a 
bizarre one, for that matter). consequently, in the course of history different 
naturalisms have been developed, depending on the views of nature that each 
period has held. thus, in discussing the nature of contemporary naturalism, 
one has to consider which is the conception of nature that the philosophers who 
label themselves naturalists are referring to. still, the answer to this question is 
not univocal.
most contemporary naturalists – the “strict naturalists” – take the term 
“nature” as referring only to the subject matter of the natural sciences, if 
not to the subject matter of physics alone1. but according to other naturalist 
philosophers – the “liberal naturalists” – while the subject matter of the natural 
sciences is certainly a fundamental component of the concept of nature, it does 
not exhaust it. this is because a “second nature” (to use the aristotelian term 
revived by John mcdowell [1994]) also exists, which is distinct from the nature 
that is investigated by the natural sciences. 
1   see Papineau 1993 and 2007; ritchie 2009; baker 2013, part i.
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“second nature” stands for the world of culture, into which we enter by way 
of education, and this is a world that is still “natural”, even if it cannot be 
accounted for by the natural sciences.
In the first place, therefore, liberal and strict naturalists differ over their 
respective metaphysical views as to what nature is – that is, whether nature 
coincides with, or is broader than, the subject matter of the natural sciences. 
this metaphysical difference generates three other differences, respectively 
at the epistemological, the semantic, and the metaphilosophical level.
More specifically, the strict naturalists accept: (i) an ontological tenet according 
to which reality (that is, nature) consists of nothing but the entities to 
which successful explanations of the natural sciences commit us; (ii) an 
epistemological tenet according to which scientific inquiry is our only genuine 
source of knowledge or understanding; all other alleged forms of knowledge 
(e.g. a priori knowledge) or understanding are either illegitimate or reducible 
in principle to scientific knowledge; (iii) a semantic tenet according to which no 
truth-apt factual judgments exist that do not regard scientifically accepted 
entities, and are irreducible to judgments regarding such entities; (iv) a 
metaphilosophical tenet, according to which philosophy must be continuous 
with science as to its contents, methods, and purposes2.
the main problem that strict naturalism faces has been called the “placement 
problem” (Price 2004) or the “location problem” (Jackson 1998, pp. 1-5). it 
concerns the items that are part of the common-sense view of the world 
(which the liberal naturalists connect with our “second nature”), but at least 
at their face value do not belong to the scientific view of the world – that is, 
are not part of “first nature”. Examples of this category are moral features, 
free will, normativity, consciousness, and intentional properties. according 
to the strict naturalists, either these features are in principle reducible to 
the features accepted by natural science, and are thus investigable with 
the scientific means, or they are just fictions, in which case no judgment 
concerning them can be objective.
liberal naturalism liberalizes the tenets of strict naturalism, by accepting: (i) 
a liberalized ontological tenet, according to which there may be entities that are 
both irreducible to, and ontologically independent of, entities whose nature 
and behavior are not explainable by science but are not supernatural either; 
(ii) a liberalized epistemological tenet, according to which legitimate forms of 
understanding (such as conceptual analysis, imaginative speculation or 
2   differently from what i did in de caro & voltolini 2010 and de caro 2010, in the list of the 
commitments of contemporary naturalism here i also mention a semantic tenet of liberal 
naturalism. i think this is especially important for understanding the originality of Putnam’s 
view.
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introspection) exist that are neither reducible to scientific understanding nor 
incompatible with it; (iii) a liberalized semantic tenet according to which there 
are truth-apt factual judgments that do not concern scientifically accepted 
entities or properties and are irreducible to judgments regarding such entities 
or properties; (iv) a liberalized metaphilosophical tenet, according to which there 
are issues in dealing with which philosophy is not continuous with science as 
to its content, method and purpose.
The main difficulty that liberal naturalism encounters may be labelled the 
“reconciliation problem”. How can the common sense image and the scientific 
image be on a par with each other, i.e. without one being conceptually prior on 
the other? What kind of relation is there between the scientific descriptions of 
the world and those referring to our second-nature features? is that a relation 
of supervenience (and in case, of which kind?), asupervenience, grounding, 
incommensurability, or what? in the next paragraph of this article i will 
discuss a prototypical form of liberal naturalism, proposed by hilary Putnam 
in the last years. in the last paragraph i will instead discuss a different 
proposal that, stricto sensu, is not a form of liberal naturalism but has many 
similarities with it: lynne baker’s near-naturalism.
the cliché according to which Putnam is guilty of changing his mind too often 
is unfair for at least two reasons. one is that, in itself, there is nothing wrong 
– no guilt! – in changing one’s own mind (unless the change is due to bad 
reasons or bad faith, which certainly is not the case for Putnam). 
another reason, more relevant here, is that there are many important 
issues about which Putnam has not changed his mind for many years. the 
fact/value dichotomy, conceptual pluralism and conceptual relativity, the 
externalist theory of meaning, a cognitivist and realist view of ethics, and 
the denial of metaphysical realism are only some of these issues. another, 
very important thesis about which Putnam has not changed his mind, with 
the exception of few very early publications, is that science is a fundamental 
source of knowledge but not the only source of knowledge. to paraphrase an 
excellent non-professional philosopher, for Putnam there are more things in 
heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our science; but still nothing can be 
truthfully said that would contradict science.
these views sound very much like liberal naturalism3. but this is no 
coincidence, of course, since Putnam – with mcdowell and P.F. strawson 
– is one of the founding fathers of that philosophical movement (whose 
grandfather is John dewey). let us now look in turn at the four tenets of 
liberal naturalism and see how Putnam has accounted for them.
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let us begin with the liberalized ontological tenet. according to this tenet, 
besides the entities assumed by the natural sciences, we should also admit 
the existence of other entities whose reality is presupposed either by the 
social sciences and/or by our non-scientific practices, and that (without 
being supernatural) are both irreducible to and ontologically independent 
of the entities whose nature and behavior are explainable by the natural 
sciences. according to a common strictly monistic view – advocated, 
among many, by Quine – the world is composed by exactly one domain of 
individuals (ontology) and one domain of properties attributed to those 
individuals (ideology) and science alone has the ability to determine what 
these domains are. this view characterizes strict naturalism, and Putnam 
strongly refuses it. however, differently from the antinaturalist thinkers, 
who typically defend one or the other among the antirealistic views of 
science (such as conventionalism, instrumentalism, or relativism), Putnam 
is a stern realist about science – i.e., he believes that scientific theories can 
be (and often are) true or approximately true and that scientific terms 
refer to real entities also when those are unobservable. in this perspective, 
Putnam (1975, 2012b) has developed the famous “no-miracles argument”, 
which advocates scientific realism by appealing to an inference to the best 
explanation. the core of that argument is that realism recommends itself 
insofar as it offers a much more convincing account of the great success of 
modern science than antirealism does – since for the latter view the success 
of science is nothing less than an unexplainable miracle.
But, even though he is a scientific realist, Putnam refuses the strict 
naturalists’ monistic view for two main reasons. First, because of the 
phenomenon he calls “conceptual relativity”, which means that some 
theories can be cognitively equivalent even if prima facie they appear 
incompatible. (less equivocally, this phenomenon could be labelled 
“descriptive equivalence”, since the other expression may suggest a 
connection with relativism and antirealism which is entirely inappropriate). 
As Putnam convincingly argues, in some scientific fields, such as 
mathematical physics, this phenomenon is ubiquitous.
to take an example from a paper with the title “bosonization as duality” 
that appeared in nuclear Physics b some years ago, there are quantum 
mechanical schemes some of whose representations depict the particles 
in a system as bosons while others depict them as fermions. as their 
use of the term “representations” indicates, real live physicists – not 
philosophers with any particular philosophical axe to grind – do not 
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regard this as a case of ignorance. in their view, the “bosons” and 
“fermions” are simply artifacts of the representation used. but the system 
is mind-independently real, for all that, and each of its states is a mind 
independently real condition, that can be represented in each of these 
different ways. and that is exactly the conclusion i advocate [...]. [these] 
descriptions are both answerable to the very same aspect of reality, [...] 
they are “equivalent descriptions” (Putnam 2012a, pp. 63-64).
the second reason why Putnam refuses the old monistic view about 
ontology is more interesting for our purposes. it consists in the fact that, in 
his view, the ontology of the world cannot be limited to the entities and the 
properties described by natural science.
i do indeed deny that the world can be completely described in the 
language game of theoretical physics; not because there are regions in 
which physics is false, but because, to use aristotelian language, the world 
has many levels of form, and there is no realistic possibility of reducing 
them all to the level of fundamental physics (Putnam 2012a, p. 65).
one of Putnam’s favorite examples is that, depending on our interests, we 
can correctly and usefully describe a chair in the alternative languages 
of carpentry, furniture design, geometry, or etiquette. each of these 
descriptions is useful in its own way, without being reducible to any of the 
others. there is no a fundamental theory of what being a chair is, so to 
speak. and this is valid with regard to a vast amount of entities (possibly 
all of them, with the exception of the entities of microphysics), since they 
can be described in different ways not just because of conceptual relativity, 
but also because things have different properties that belong to different 
ontological regions, to use husserl’s term.
in this pluralistic light, the old ontological project of providing a general 
inventory of the universe, which would supposedly encompass the 
references of all possible objective statements – a project of which strict 
naturalism is the last expression – has made us wandering in cloud cuckoo 
land for too long (Putnam 2004, p. 85). and this means that ontology with a 
capital “o” is a dead project. but another form of ontology (one with a lower-
case initial) is still possible, i.e., the search for the entities our best theories 
and practices commit us to. but this cannot be carried out if one is driven 
by an ideological bias that there is one, and only one, true theory of the 
world. nor can it be carried out without noticing that reality has different 
levels. and it is a pragmatic question which level is relevant to a particular 
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discursive practice.
however, the fact that reality is articulated in different levels raises 
a question about the relationship running between them. about this 
relationship, Putnam is straightforward: different levels of reality are linked 
by a relationship of supervenience (sometimes local, sometimes global) 
from the most basic to the less basic. in this sense, it is useful to mention a 
discussion between Putnam and stephen White. White (2008) defends the 
idea that the “agential perspective” and the “objective perspective” are 
categorically different and, in fact, incommensurable, so that between them 
there is a relation of “asupervenience” (neither supervenience nor non-
supervience). to this Putnam replies,
i do think that all of our capacities, including “agential” ones (a category 
which, as stephen White correctly argues, includes our perceptual capacities), 
supervene on the states of the physical universe, including, in a great many 
cases, past as well as present ones [...]. i am a naturalist – a non-reductive 
naturalist – and i don’t see how any naturalist can deny global supervenience 
of human psychological states and capacities. (and appealing to the 
murky doctrine of “incommensurability” is no help). but there is no one 
simple answer to the question of whether our agential capacities are locally 
supervenient (supervenient on just the relevant brain-states) or globally 
supervenient on factors external to the brain, and even to the organism, 
because it depends on which agential capacities one is talking about, even if we 
restrict the issue to perceptual capacities (Putnam 2008, p. 29).
these ontological claims have of course important epistemological 
implications. in this respect Putnam holds what i have called a “liberalized 
epistemological” view, claiming that many cognitively non-equivalent and 
mutually irreducible conceptual schemes have to be used to account for the 
different levels of reality. and this means that, pace Quine, there is no such 
a thing as a “first-grade conceptual system” (i.e., the natural sciences, if not 
physics alone), which is in charge of describing reality, while all the other 
conceptual systems are either reducible in principle to it or completely 
flawed. According to Putnam, we legitimately “employ many different kinds 
of discourses, discourses subject to different standards and possessing 
different sorts of applications” (2004, p. 22).
Putnam also endorses the “liberalized semantic tenet”, in a very radical 
way. not only he does say there are true judgments that do not concern 
scientifically accepted entities or properties, but he also adds that some of 
these judgments are objective even without describing anything; that is, 
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there can be “objectivity without objects” (Putnam 2004, pp. 77-78), as in the 
case of ethical and mathematical judgments. For example, no special moral 
entities (such as free-floating values) exist that make our moral judgments 
true or false. this does not amount to saying that there are no non-special 
moral entities, since these certainly exist, and are the agents. still when we 
say that someone is good, there is no ontologically autonomous “goodness” 
to which we refer.
Finally, as to his metaphilosophy, Putnam strongly refuses Quine’s view of 
philosophy as a branch of science. according to Putnam, there certainly 
are legitimate philosophical issues that are not scientific in character and 
cannot be treated by using the methods of the natural sciences. to mention 
some of these issues: the ontological status of possible worlds, the conditions 
of a just war, the skeptical challenge to the existence of the external world, 
the ontological proof of god’s existence, the conceptual link between free 
will and moral responsibility – and the list of specifically philosophical 
issues could go on for very long.
Putnam himself states this point with great clarity when he claims that 
philosophy has two faces: the Theoretical face which aims at clarifying “what 
we think we know and work out how it all ‘hangs’ together”, as Wilfrid 
sellars [1962, p. 37] famously put it in, and the Moral face (which “interrogates 
our lives and our cultures as they have been up to now, and which 
challenges us to reform both”)4. it is clear that the moral face of philosophy 
does not depend on science as its primary source of inspiration, and even 
less as its foundation. this, however, does not mean that what it is said at 
the moral level can be incompatible with what science says about the world. 
if a defense of racism, for example, can certainly be criticized from a moral 
point of view, it is just refuted by the strong scientific evidence that human 
races do not exist.
summarizing, as to his ontological, epistemological, semantical and 
metaphilosophical views, Putnam is undoubtedly a liberal naturalist.
a very useful distinction made by lynne baker in her important book, 
naturalism and the first-person Perspective (2013), is that between the diverse forms 
of scientific naturalism, which depend on how its advocates respond to some 
crucial open issues. in particular, some of them (such as Philip Pettit) claim, and 
others (such as hilary Kornblith and Philip Kitcher) deny, that all the sciences 
are reducible to microphysics. and some (the “disenchanted naturalists”, such as 
alex rosenberg) maintain that the so-called “fundamental questions of life” 
4   Putnam 2010, p. 93. on this issue, see also de caro & macarthur 2004 and 2012. 
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disintegrate once they are framed within the scientific worldview, while others 
(the “optimistic naturalists”, such as Philip Kitcher and daniel dennett) think 
that such questions are legitimate and can be understood (if not answered) 
with scientifically kosher conceptual tools. However, all advocates of scientific 
naturalism encounter serious difficulties when they try to naturalize – either 
by reduction or elimination – the most relevant features of the common-sense 
view of the world. in this regard, huw Price has talked of a “Placement Problem”: 
“if all reality is ultimately natural reality, how are we to ‘place’ moral facts, 
mathematical facts, meaning facts, and so on? how are to locate topics of these 
kinds within a naturalistic framework, thus conceived?” (Price 2004, p. 74).
A different route has been taken by influential philosophers such as P.F. 
strawson, John mcdowell, Jennifer hornsby, barry stroud, and (as we have 
seen) hilary Putnam, who have proposed different versions of a more liberal 
naturalism5. these authors aim at accounting for the common-sense features 
of the world at face value, without being at odds with the scientific view of the 
world.
baker locates her view in the periphery of the liberal naturalism – a view 
with which she sympathizes, with an important distinction, as we will 
see. she explicitly sides with the liberal naturalists in claiming that what 
escapes naturalization is not necessarily ontologically unacceptable. When 
a phenomenon that is central in our lives appears impossible from the point 
of view of a particular philosophical conception, this is a kind of reductio 
for that conception: “We should not embrace a metaphysics that makes 
mundane but significant phenomena unintelligible” (Baker 2013, p. 73). 
Among the significant and arguably irreducible phenomena one cannot 
dispense with, there is a very important one that according to baker has been 
unjustly neglected by both scientific and liberal naturalists: the first-person 
perspective of the world. According to her, genuinely first-person aspects of 
reality exist and they cannot be explained nor explained away by science. 
this, however, is not because science adopts a third-person perspective, 
as is commonly thought, but rather because “the so-called third-person 
perspective is centerless; it is [thomas nagel’s] ‘view from nowhere’ ” (baker 
2013, p. xix).
in this respect baker makes an important distinction between “rudimentary 
first-person perspective” and “robust first-person perspective” (a distinction 
that is very promising, it could be argued, since it appears confirmed 
by massive evidence coming out of cognitive science). the rudimentary 
first-person perspective is a dispositional property that does not require 
5   For a general presentation of the issue, see de caro & macarthur 2010 and de caro & voltolini 
2010.
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language, allows phenomenal consciousness, and makes it possible for an 
organism to interact, consciously and intentionally, with the environment. 
The robust first-person perspective, which subsumes the rudimentary one, 
is the capacity that every person endowed with a language has of thinking 
of herself as the object of her own thought. this capacity is a dispositional 
property, which is expressed with i* thoughts – i.e., “every thought, utterance, 
or action that exhibits self-consciousness” (baker 2013, p. xx), such as ‘i hope 
that i* will be able to write a fair review of lynne baker’s book’. according to 
Baker, the robust first-person perspective is an emergent property that may 
globally supervene on the physical properties of the world, but can neither be 
explained by science nor explained away; consequently, the account of reality 
advocated by scientific naturalism, which is wholly impersonal, must be false.
Having a robust fist-person perspective is indispensable for self-evaluation, 
self-understanding, moral responsibility, agency, practical reasoning, and 
deliberation; and, of course, it is a necessary condition of self-consciousness. 
on the last issue, baker strongly disagrees with most philosophers of mind – 
including Ned Block and David Chalmers – who do not find it scientifically or 
metaphysically puzzling.
Baker also defends a detailed non-Cartesian account of the first-person 
perspective, intended as an irreducible but not supernatural feature of reality. 
her defense is based on two “unpopular views” (baker 2013, p. 220), ontological 
emergence and downward causation. against the mainstream, she argues that 
higher-level properties do not locally supervene on lower-level properties 
but are constituted by them – in the technical sense of “constitution” that 
baker has explored at length in her past work. still, she notices, property-
constitution is compatible with global supervenience (and this may make her 
views less alarming for some philosophers).
Finally, baker advocates “near-naturalism”, a view that in her opinion can 
adequately account for the first-person perspective. Adapting Dan Dennett’s 
famous phrase, one could say that for baker near naturalism can give what 
is worth wanting in naturalism without committing us to the ineffective 
reduction and elimination strategies of the common-sense features of the 
world. in fact, on the one side near-naturalism “does not take science to be 
the exclusive arbiter of reality” (baker 2013, p. 208); on other side, it is not 
committed to supernaturalism. therefore, baker seems to have a point when 
she claims that near-naturalism is palatable for liberal naturalists. but one 
thing should be noted: the suffix “near” in the expression signals the fact 
that this view is neutral regarding the possible existence of supernatural 
entities. even naturalists of a liberal tendency (but not all of them: see for 
example robert audi 2000) would probably disagree with such neutrality; 
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yet this does not change the fact that they could be happy with the positive 
part of baker’s conception.
i said above that baker’s view could be located in the periphery of liberal 
naturalism. indeed, even if regarding its positive stances, this view 
could certainly be considered a form of liberal naturalism, it does not 
incorporate a refusal of supernaturalism, as the standard liberal naturalist 
views do. this is because, as we have seen, baker is in fact neutral as to 
the issue if one should also accept supernatural entities in our ontology: 
her near-naturalism is thus compatible with both liberal naturalism and 
supernaturalism.
most, if not all, liberal naturalists would disagree with this part of baker’s 
view, considering it too liberal – or, which is the same, not naturalistic 
enough. however, these philosophers would split as to the reason for 
disagreeing with baker. some, as Putnam, would accept her idea of giving a 
metaphysical interpretation of anti-reductive naturalism, but would refuse 
to broaden this view to the point of incorporating entities that would not 
obey the laws of nature. other philosophers, such as John mcdowell, akeel 
bilgrami, david macarthur, and stephen White tend instead to be quietists 
regarding metaphysical issues, such as the relation between physical and 
personal entities, whereas baker aims at working out the framework of 
a unified metaphysical view of the world, which could encompass both 
scientific and common sense entities.
lynne baker’s partial opening towards the possibility of supernaturalism 
would then be refused both by metaphysically oriented liberal naturalists 
and by quietists liberal naturalists. and it is indeed an open question 
whether liberal naturalists should prefer a quietist or a metaphysical 
approach – and certainly one that will be debated for many years.
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